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LET MY LOVE OPEN THE DOOR: THE CASE FOR
EXTENDING MARITAL PRIVILEGES TO UNMARRIED
COHABITANTS
JULIA L. CARDOZO*

Catherine Acker and Samuel Holly lived together for twentyfive years and held themselves out as a married couple throughout that
period.I The two states in which they lived over the course of their
relationship did not recognize common law marriage. 2 In 1993,
Catherine was a defendant in a criminal trial for robbery and unlawful
use of a firearm. 3 Samuel agreed to testify against her. Blindsided by
the idea that intimate conversations with her longtime partner could be
used against her at trial, Catherine sought refuge in the marital
communications privilege to bar Samuel's testimony.5 Even though a
claim of a marital privilege generally must be supported by a valid
marriage, she argued that it should extend to their relationship because
it was akin to a marriage except for the technical legal status.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
Catherine's plea. First, it acknowledged the societal trend of couples
choosing to cohabitate without marrying; 7 however, the Court
disagreed with Catherine and followed the bright-line rule that marital
privileges cannot be invoked in the absence of a valid marriage.' The
Court thus rejected Catherine's privilege claim, and permitted
Samuel's testimony. 9

Copyright 0 2011 by Julia Cardozo.
*University of Maryland School of Law Juris Doctor candidate, 2011. Middlebury College,
B.A., History, 2006. Special thanks to Professor Jana Singer for her guidance and
encouragement, and to my family for their constant support.
I. United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514 (4th Cir. 1995).
2. Id. at 514. They lived in New York and North Carolina. Id.
3. Id.at5ll.
4. Id.at5ll-12.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 514.
7. Id. at 515 (noting that "present day experience may indicate that more couples are
living together without the benefit of marriage").
8. Id. (holding that "the defendant must have assumed both the privileges and the
responsibilities of a valid marriage under the law of the state in which the privilege is
asserted").
9. Id. at 515.
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In the fifteen years following this decision, unmarried
cohabitation has increased in popularity, subsequently gaining social
acceptance.' 0 Furthermore, states have granted a number of rights and
protections traditionally accorded exclusively to married couples to
unmarried partners." But, like the Fourth Circuit, the criminal justice
system has been slow to follow this trend, and still refuses to grant
marital privileges to unmarried partners on the grounds that these
privileges hamper the truth-finding process.
This note examines the conflict between the trend among states
of protecting non-marital family relationships by granting legal rights
and obligations to unmarried partners, and the criminal justice
system's refusal to extend marital privilege to certain unmarried
partners. Parts I and II discuss the history and background of the
marital privileges. Part III examines cohabitation statistics, rights and
obligations between cohabitants, and rights and obligations of
cohabitants with respect to third parties. It also analyzes tort cases as a
possible indicator of the benefits and consequences of extending
marital privileges to unmarried partners.12 Part IV provides
recommendations for extending the marital privileges to unmarried
cohabitants. This paper concludes that the marital communications
privilege should be extended to unmarried couples deemed eligible
after a factual inquiry.13 The continuation of a status-based
requirement is appropriate only for the adverse testimonial privilege.14

1. THE HISTORY,

RATIONALE, AND DEVELOPMENT OF MARITAL
PRIVILEGES

A. Background
An important right possessed by married individuals is the
ability to invoke evidentiary privileges based on marriage in a criminal
trial. These privileges consist of two parts: the marital communications
privilege (MCP) and the adverse testimonial privilege (ATP). The
MCP protects "communications made in confidence between the
spouses during a valid marriage."' 5 This privilege belongs to both
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.B-C.
12. See infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part IV.A.3.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v.
Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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spouses, or whichever spouse seeks to prevent disclosure of certain
information, meaning that either a witness-spouse or a defendantspouse may object to testimonr by his or her spouse that would reveal
a confidential communication. The ATP allows a witness-spouse in a
criminal case to refuse to testify against his or her spouse when the
spouse is a defendant. 17 The privilege belongs to the witness spouse,
meaning that only the witness spouse, not the defendant spouse, may
refuse to testify both about facts she observed and about information
communicated to her by her spouse.' 8
The underlying reason for both privileges is marital
preservation.1 9 The United States Supreme Court once described the
marriage relationship as "the best solace of human existence," 20 and
later characterized marital privileges as "so essential to the
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the
disadvantages to the administration of justice." 1 However, this stance
in favor of marital harmony stands at odds with the "fundamental
maxim" long recognized by Supreme Court that the public has a right
to "every man's evidence." 22
Case law mandates that evidentiary privileges be narrowly
construed in order to protect the truth-finding process. 23 When
considering the scope of an evidentiary privilege, a court must decide
whether it "promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the
need for probative evidence in the administration of criminal
24
justice.
B. Marital CommunicationsPrivilege
The MCP exists to preserve and strengthen the marriage
relationship by protecting intimate information exchanged between

16. Id.
17. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, ReconsideringSpousal Privileges after Crawford, 33
AM. J. CRIM. L. 339, 356-57 (2006).
18. Id
19. See id. at 358-61.
20. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (quoting Stein v. Bowman, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839)).
21. Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
22. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting United States v. Byran, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950)).
23. Id. at 48-49 n.9 (state-specific statutes regarding martial privileges). Federal courts
recognize both a MCP and an ATP under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, as established by
common law. See generally FED. R. EviD. 501.
24. Id. at 51.
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spouses.25 To fall within the scope of the MCP, there must be a
communication between a couple who was married at the time of the
communication, and the communication must be intended to be
confidential, meaning that it was not made in the presence of a third
party or intended to be communicated to a third party.26
Unlike the ATP, the MCP may be invoked by either spouse to
prevent disclosure of confidential communications between the
spouses made during the marriage.27 Accordingly, even when a
witness spouse waives the ATP, he or she may not testify over the
defendant spouse's objection about confidential communications made
during the marriage. The MCP endures even after the marriage in
which the communication took place has ended.2 9
As a communication-based privilege, the MCP does not sweep
as broadly as the ATP because it protects only private
communications. 30 For this reason, it is analogous to other
communication privileges available in a criminal trial such as the
priest/penitent, attorney/client, and physician/patient privileges. Like
other communication privileges, the MCP focuses on the nature of the
communication rather than its content. Therefore, material of an
intimate nature, intended to be confidential, discussed in front of a
third party is not protected, while a fairly routine conversation kept
between the spouses is protected.31 Because evaluating the content is
difficult without compelling release, the communication is presumed
to be protected absent evidence that it has been shared with a third
party or that it is part of a conspiracy.32 Additionally, the privilege will
not apply if, at the time of the communication, the couple was
separated and the marriage was irreconcilable.3 3
Courts conduct factual investigations to determine whether the
communication meets the elements required for use of the MCP.
Where evidence exists that the communication has been shared with a
25. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 541(Md. 1977) (citing CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 86

(2d ed. 1972)).

26. Id. at 543 (defining a communication as "words or utterances intended to convey a
message").
27. See id. at 543.
28. United States v. Estes, 793 F.2d 465, 476 (2d Cir. 1986).
29. Lofton, 957 F.2d at 476-77. A typical MCP statute states that "[o]ne spouse is not
competent to disclose any confidential communication between the spouses occurring during
the marriage." MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC.

§

9-105 (LexisNexis 2006).

30. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
31. See Wong-Wing v. State, 847 A.2d 1206, 1211-12 (Md. 2004).
32. United States v. Parker, 834 F.2d 408, 411 (4th Cir.1987). See 6 LYNN MCCLAIN,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL,

33. See infra notes 15, 26.

§ 505:2,

at 154 (2001).
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third party, a court may conduct a factual inquiry to determine whether
the communication is protected.3 4 For example, one court determined
that a husband's letter to his wife was not confidential when the
husband knew that his wife had difficulty reading and would need a
third party to read the letter aloud to her.35
Some courts also conduct factual inquiries to evaluate
application of the MCP if there is evidence of separation and
irreconcilability of the marriage at the time the statement was made.3 6
If the court finds that the couple is legally or permanently separated,
the marriage is considered irreconcilable and the privilege will not
apply. 37 Courts consider several factors to determine whether a couple
is permanently separated, including: duration of the separation;
stability of the marriage at the time of the communication; whether a
divorce action had been filed and the conduct of the parties since that
filing; whether a property settlement had been proposed; and any
statements by the parties regarding irreconcilability or the reasons for
separation.3 8
C. Adverse Testimonial Privilege
The ATP is rooted in common law jurisprudence and was
originally based on a two-step theory. First, a husband was not
permitted to testify against himself because he was an interested party
in the proceeding.3 9 Second, a wife was considered to be the same
person as her husband and therefore could not testify against him due
40
to the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. When
women began gaining legal rights, 1 the justification for the ATP
shifted towards the strong public policy interest in protecting the peace
and harmony of a marital unit.42 The Maryland Court of Appeals
34. Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 543 (1977) (citing Pereira v. United States, 347, 361
(1954)).
35. Grulkey v. United States, 394 F.2d 244, 246 (8th Cir. 1968).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). See infra
Part IV.A.3.
37. Roberson, 859 F.2d at 1381.
38. United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Roberson, 859
F.2d at 1381).
39. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980).
40. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
41. See e.g. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
42. M. Peter Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other In
Criminal Cases, 15 MD. L. REV. 16, 17-18 (1955). See, e.g., Wolfe v. United States, 291 U.S.
7, 14 (1934) (regarding marital confidences "as so essential to the preservation of the marriage
relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice"); Johnson v.

380

U. MD. L.J. RACE,

RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL.

10:2

predicted that absence of the ATP "would adversely affect familial ties
and strike at the heart of domestic relations." 4 3 Without the privilege,
witness spouses would potentially face contempt of court charges,
perjury charges, or the destruction of their marriage.4 4
Despite the policy-driven purpose of marital harmony and
preservation, Maryland courts have applied the ATP in instances
where the value of the relationship is questionable and the marital
harmony is already disrupted.4 5 Failing marriages and marriages
entered into for reasons other than love qualify without inquiry.46
While some states have refused to apply the privilege where the
purpose of the marriage was to perpetrate a fraud and hinder the truthfinding process, the motive for the marriage in most states is irrelevant
and courts do not conduct factual inquiries into the motives for the
marriage.4 7
In Trammel v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the
availability of the ATP to the witness spouse. 4 8 The holding changed
the previous rule, which gave the defendant spouse the right to keep a
willing witness spouse off the stand. 49 The Court reasoned that only
the witness spouse possesses a sufficiently important interest in marital
harmony. Regardless of the witness spouse's motivation, when he or
she chooses to testify against the defendant spouse, "their relationship
is almost certainly in disrepair [and] there is probably little in the way
of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve." 5 Accordingly, the
Court upheld this narrow version of the ATP, resting it solely in the
hands of the witness spouse while adhering to the policy rationale
behind it.52
State, 848 A.2d 660, 667 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (referring to the ATP as necessary "to
maintain and foster the marital relationship").
43. Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 756 A.2d 526, 543 (Md. 2000).
44. Rule Rendering Husband or Wife Incompetent as a Witness for the Other in a
Criminal Case, 93 A.L.R. 1144 (1934); 6 McCLAFN, supra note 33, at § 505.1, at 148-49. See
also Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933) (arguing that admitting spousal
testimony "would subject the witness to the temptation to commit perjury").
45. Hagez v. State, 676 A.2d 992, 1001 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (explaining that
the privilege applies "to anyone who qualifies as a 'spouse,' without regard for the motive of
the marriage" and that the trial court is not required to investigate the reasons for the
marriage); Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 544 (Md.1977) (asserting that "application of the
privilege does not depend upon the stability of the marriage .... ).
46. See Hagez, 676 A.2d at 1001 n.7; Coleman, 281 Md. at 544.
47. 6, supra note 33, at § 505:2, at 153.
48. 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
49. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 (1958).
50. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52-53 (1980).
51. Id. at 52.
52. Id. at 53.
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Statutes allowing the ATP reflect the Trammel holding that the
privilege belongs solely to the witness spouse in a criminal case.53
Neither the defendant spouse nor a witness who is not married to the
defendant spouse may invoke it. 54 Unlike the MCP, it is invoked to
exclude evidence of criminal acts and both public and private
communications.5 5
Courts emphasize that a witness spouse's ability to exercise the
privilege is contingent upon the existence of a valid marriage to the
defendant spouse at the time of the trial.56 The witness spouse must
prove the validity of the marriage at trial by a preponderance of the
evidence, typically by showing the marriage certificate. It is the
status of marriage, not the quality or characteristics of the relationship,
that makes a spouse non-compellable for testimony.5 8
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVILEGES IN THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM

Testimonial privileges are generally disfavored within the
criminal justice system because they hamper the truth-finding
process. 59 Courts strongly disfavor testimonial privile es in criminal
cases, 60 mandating that they be "strictly construed"6 and accepted
only where permitting the privilege serves "a public good transcending
the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for

53. A typical statute states that the "spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be
compelled to testify as an adverse witness." MD. CODE ANN., CTs & JUD. PROC. § 9-106.
While the ATP belongs solely to the witness spouse in the majority of states, the ATP belongs
to the defendant in some states. See, e.g. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §5.60.060 (West 2009 &
Supp. 2010). In other states, the ATP belongs to both spouses. See, e.g.. W. VA. CODE ANN.
§57-3-3 (LexisNexis 2005).
54. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53 (1980).
55. Id. at 51.
56. United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 515 (1994).
57. 6 MCCLAIN, supra note 33, at § 505:1, at 150. The privilege does not exist once the
marriage has terminated. Id. at 151.
58. Rule Rendering Husband or Wife Incompetent as a Witness for the Other in a
Criminal Case, supra note 55.
59. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50 (stating that "privilege contravenes that fundamental
principle that 'the public... has a right to every man's evidence"' (quoting United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)); Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (regarding testimonial privileges as "not lightly created not expansively construed,
for they are in derogation for the search for truth" (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 710 (1974)).
60. United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994) (discouraging
testimonial privileges because "they result in the suppression of competent evidence").
61. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50.
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ascertaining truth."6 2 As Justice Scalia proclaimed, it is "our duty to
proceed cautiously when erecting barriers between us and the truth." 63
In the 1996 case of Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme Court took
the rare step of aVroving an additional privilege, the psychotherapistpatient privilege. In Jaffee, the family of a man shot and killed by a
police officer brought a civil suit against the officer. 65 The family
alleged that the officer violated the deceased's constitutional rights by
using excessive force. 66 The lower court ordered the defendant officer
to provide the plaintiff with notes taken by a social worker during her
counseling sessions with the police officer after the shooting. 67 Neither
the social worker nor the officer complied. 6 8 The Supreme Court
determined that the psychotherapist privilege "promotes sufficient,
important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence."
Such interests include the need for absolute trust and confidence for
effective psychotherapy treatment, and the public interest in "the
mental health of our Nation's citizenry." 70 The Court emphasized in its
decision, however, that part of the reason it accepted the privilege was
because it would have a minimal effect on truth-finding.7 1
Despite the Court's admission in Jaffe that the privilege had a
minimal effect on truth-finding, the decision nonetheless affirms the
notion that society and the judiciary support the existence of privileges
at the expense of truth-finding because they promote the interest of
protecting important relationships. 72 The relationship between husband
and wife is at the top of this list. American courts have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of the institution of marriage, recognizing

62. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
63. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 21 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
64. Id. at 9-10 (majority opinion).
65. Id. at 43-45.
66. Id at 5.
67. Id at 5-6.
68. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5.
69. Id. at 9-10.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 12 (explaining that "the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the
denial of the privilege is modest" because without the privilege, "confidential conversations
between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly when its
obvious that the circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in
litigation." Therefore, "much of the desirable evidence to which litigants.. .seek access... is
unlikely to come into being. This unspoken 'evidence' will therefore serve no greater truthseeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged.").
72. See infra Part I.A-C.; See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 542 (Md. 1977)
(explaining that the privilege "was designed to protect and strengthen the marital bond")
(citing Poppe v. Poppe, 144 N.E.2d 72, 73 (N.Y. 1957)).

2010]

LET

MY LOVE OPEN THE DOOR

383

it as a fundamental right, 73 and characterizing it as "the most important
relation in life" 74 that is "fundamental to [our] very existence and

survival." 75
The interest in protecting sufficiently important relationships,
however, inevitably conflicts with the interest in a successful criminal
justice system based on truth-finding.76 The Supreme Court has
recognized this conflict. 77 In Trammel, for example, it acknowledged
the need to balance these competing interests in its decision to scale
back the ATP. 78 It observed that the pre-Trammel scope of the ATP
goes well beyond making "every man's house his castle," and allows
an individual to make his house "a den of thieves." 79 In other words, it
"secures every man one safe and unquestionable and ever ready
accomplice for every imaginable crime."
By contrast, the Court has emphasized that when Congress
created the Federal Rule of Evidence 501 on privilege,8 it intended to
"provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on
a case-by-case basis, and to leave the door open to change."82 A
court's ability to re-define privileges and recognize new ones,
combined with the deeply-rooted interest in protecting family
relationships and modem perceptions of such relationships, suggest
that marital privileges could be well-situated for change.

73. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (recognizing the right to
marry as "of fundamental importance for all individuals" and as "part of the fundamental 'right
of privacy') (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)); Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (identifying "[m]arriage and
procreation [as] fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
74. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
75. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
76. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
77. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47-50 (1980).
78. Id. at 52.
79. Id. at 51-52 (quoting 5 Rationale of Judicial Evidence 340 (1827)).
80. Id. at 52 (quoting 5 Rationale of Judicial Evidence 338 (1827)).
81. FED. R. EvID. 501.
82. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep.
Hungate).
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III. THE STATISTICS AND RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF COHABITANTS

A. The Rising Popularity of Cohabitation

Cohabitation is an increasingly popular alternative to marriage
in the United States. The relative importance of marital versus nonmarital relationships has undergone significant transformation in the
last 50 years, and increasing numbers of couples are cohabitating
rather than marrying. 83 Cohabitating couples include both couples
legally eligible to marry who choose not to (homosexual and
heterosexual), and homosexual couples who are legally ineligible to
marry in their state. Both groups of cohabitants are steadily gaining
legal and societal acceptance. 84
The cultural and societal movements of the 1960s provided an
environment conducive to cohabitation. The Vietnam War and the
Civil Rights Movement created a sharp contrast to the traditional and
conservative society of the 1950s. The counterculture attitude of the
times "produced a new world in which the vision of sex without
reputational harm became a reality."85
The number of unmarried cohabitants is increasing, but still
pales in comparison to the married population. 86 The percentage of
married adults has fallen in the last decade, "from fifty-seven percent
in 2000 to fifty-two percent in 2009."87 In 2008, there were
approximately 5.6 million opposite-sex unmarried cohabitants and
approximately 415,000 same-sex unmarried cohabitants in the United
States.88 The number of unmarried same-sex couples in 2008 increased
by 75,000 couples since 2000.89 Approximately 55.6 million oppositesex couples and a mere 32,000 same-sex couples were reported as
married in 2008.90 That year, more than 80,000 same-sex couples

83. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
84. See The Legal Rights of UnmarriedCohabitants in Maryland, WOMEN'S LAW CTR.
OF MD., 7 (2002), http://www.wlcmd.org/pdf/UnmarriedCohabitants.pdf.
85. Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal
Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 312 (2008-2009).
86. Gary J. Gates, Same-Sex Spouses and Unmarried Partners in the American
Community Survey,2008, THE
WILLIAMS
INST.,
Appendix
(Sept.23,
2009),
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/72t806m7.
87. Erik Eckholm, Saying No To 7 Do, 'Economy In Mind, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 29,
2010, at Al5, availableat 2010 WLNR 19313508.
88. Gates, supra note 85, at Appendix, Table 1. Id. at 2.
89. Id at 2.
90. Gates, supra note 85, at Appendix, Table 1. Id. at 3.
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entered into a civil union, or registered as domestic partners or
reciprocal beneficiaries. 9'
Despite the increase in cohabitation, cohabitating relationships
do not have the longevity or stability of marriages. 92 A majority of
first-time premarital cohabitants marry within five years (although this
number is declining), but only ten percent of the couples who do not
marr7 within this time frame are still together after the five-year cutoff. 9 The median duration of cohabitation is less than a year and a
half.94 By contrast, eighty percent of first marriages last at least five
years, and two-thirds of that eighty percent last for ten. 95 The National
Marriage Project asserts that couples who cohabitate before marriage
are more likely to divorce after getting married. 96 The discrepancy in
duration can be explained partially by characteristics typical of
cohabitants. 97 In contrast to married couples, cohabitants are less likely
to have children, less likely to become financially or emotionally
dependent on each other, and place less value on commitment and

fidelity.98
B. Rights and Obligations Of Cohabitants
A number of states have recently extended the rights and
obligations typically associated with marriage to cohabitating
couples. 99 They often refer to an unmarried couple's ability to make
important decisions and provide for one another. 00 These rights and
obligations are open to all qualifying cohabitating couples in a
majority of the states, although some states limit such protections to
9 1. Id. at i.
92. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 38-46 (Broadway

Books 2000).
93. Martha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
CohabitantObligation, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 815, 839 (2004-05).
94. Martha Garrison, The Decline ofFormal Marriage, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279, 28990 (2007).
95. Id.
96. David Popenoe & Barabara D. Whitehead, Should We Live Together? What Young
Marriage,
Before
Cohabitation
about
Know
Need
to
Adults
http://www.smartmarriages.com/cohabit.html (last vistited on Oct. 29, 2010) (citing the 1987
National Survey of Families and Households).
97. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 93, at 39-40.

98. Garrison, Decline of Formal Marriage,supra note 95, at 290.
99. See Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN

(Oct.

29,

2010,

http://www.hrc.org/documents/RelationshipRecognitionLawsMap.pdf
same-sex marriage/civil union statutes).
100. See, e.g. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §106.355.

TIME),

(map summarizing
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same-sex couples (who are precluded from marrying).10 Other states
offer protections to all couples that meet certain qualifications. 102
Many of the states that provide benefits to unmarried partners
have an ex-ante registration system in which couples must enroll in
order to be eligible for rights and obligations. 03 The New Jersey Civil
Union Registry is typical of such a system.104 To be eligible for
benefits, a couple must file a form declaring that they share a common
residence, agree to be jointly responsible for each other's basic living
expenses during the partnership, are jointly responsible for each
other's common welfare as evidenced by joint financial arrangements
or joint ownership of property, are not married or in another domestic
partnership, are not related by blood in a way that would prevent them
from marrying, choose to share in each other's lives in a committed
relationship of mutual caring, have not terminated another domestic
partnership within the last 180 days, and are the same sex and both
over the age of eighteen, or both over sixty-two if they are an oppositesex couple. 0 5 Once registered, the extent of rights afforded to
registered partners varies among states.10 6
Most states require a valid marriage for access to the marital
privileges regardless of the scope of rights afforded to unmarried
couples. Oregon and Washington are the only states whose domestic
partnership statutes specifically declare that the rights and obligations
conferred upon domestic partners include access to marital
privileges.107 Conversely, the domestic partnership laws in Maine and

have statutes that afford protections explicitly to same-sex
Maine, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and Nevada allow any two
the other requirements to be eligible for marriage-like benefits;
provide protections for same-sex couples and opposite-sex
couples over the age of sixty-two. OR. REV. STAT. § 106.340 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. §572C1 (LexisNexis 2010); MD. CODE ANN., Health - General, § 6-101 (West 2009); CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 15-22-104 to -105 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710
(West 2004 & Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-33.2-24(4) (West 2010); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 40.02 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); NEV. REv. STAT. § 122A.100 (LexisNexis 2010);

101. Oregon and Hawaii
couples; Maryland, Colorado,
unmarried persons who satisfy
New Jersey and Washington

N.J. STAT. ANN.

§

26:8A-1 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§

26.60.030 (West 2005 &

Supp. 2010).
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-l; 37:1-31a (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).
105. Id.
106. Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, supra note 100.
107. Mark Glover, Evidentiary Privilegesfor CohabitatingParents:Protecting Children
Inside and Outside of Marriage, 70 LOuISIANA L.R. 751, 775 (2010). See OR. REV. STAT.
106.340 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010).
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Hawaii expressly state that registered partners do not have access to
martial privileges. 0 8
Courts have historically denied an unmarried couple's right to
marital privileges.1 09 They typically dismiss an unmarried individual's
request to invoke a privilege due to lack of a valid marriage." 0 The
Fourth Circuit reiterated this rule in 2010 when it rejected an
appellant's claim that the trial court erred in admitting his former
wife's testimony."' The court simply held that the appellant's ATP
claim failed because the parties were divorced at the time of the trial
and there was no formal, legal relationship between the couple. 112
Three United States Circuit Courts, however, have adopted an
exception to the MCP's bright-line rule that a couple must be married
at the time of the communication to be eligible to assert the
When the couple is separated at the time of the
privilege.'
communication, the Court of Appeals for the Second, Sixth and Ninth
Circuits have held that a district court should "make a factual finding
as to whether the spouses were permanently separated at the time of
the questioned communication." 14 If the court finds that the couple
was not permanently separated, the couple has access to the MCP. The
108. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (Supp. 2008) (creating a domestic
partnership registry); ME. R. EVID. 504 (providing only spouses with the marital privileges).
109. See Lane v. State, 364 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ind. 1977) (refusing to let defendant's
girlfriend claim the MCP at the defendant's trial even though the couple considered
themselves married).
110. See United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 1995). See, e.g., Barajas
v. State, 627 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 1994) (stating that the trial court did not err when it
allowed a woman that the appellant married while he was married to his first wife to testify
against him. Id. at 438-39. In making this decision, the court relied on a previous Supreme
Court of Indiana case, Lane v. State, 364 N.E.2d 756 (Ind. 1977), that held that "privilege is
accorded only to those who maintain the legal relationship of a man and wife." Id. at 760);
Davis v. State, 103 P.3d 70, 82 (Okla.Crim.App. 2004) (upholding trial court's decision
granting admission of statements over appellant's objection because the couple had not
established "by clear and convincing evidence" that they were married).
111. United States v. Medina-Castellanos, 359 F. App'x 404, 406 (2010).
112. Id.
113. See United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1019 (6th Cir. 1993) (implying that
privilege extends to a separation that is not permanent); In re Witness Before the Grand Jury,
791 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 1986) (proposing a permanently separated test whereby courts
would be able to determine whether the couple is permanently separated and thus unable to
legally assert privilege); United States v. Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that, when privilege is questionable because the married couple is separated, the
district court should decide whether the couple had been separated at the time of
communication, and then, if the district court finds that the couple was separated, it should
investigate whether the couple could have reconciled, taking into account things such as length
of separation and strength of the marriage when communication took place).
114. Porter,986 F.2d at 1019 (citing In re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234,
238 (2d Cir. 1986), and Roberson, 859 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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Sixth Circuit justified its departure from the bright-line rule by
explaining that "[t]his factual determination will not place an
unreasonable fact-finding burden on trial courts. It should prove to be
no more difficult than the many other such fact-finding calls which
district courts must make under the Federal Rules of Evidence."H 5
C. The Rights and Obligationsof CohabitatingCouples vis-ai-vis
Third Parties
States are inconsistent in their willingness to grant unmarried
couples rights and obligations with respect to third parties. A clear
example of this is in loss of consortium ("LC") claims, where most
courts have refused to allow an unmarried cohabitant to recover
damages from a third party tortfeasor for injuries sustained by his or
her partner. 11 6
In Elden v. Sheldon,117 the California Supreme Court denied
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") and
LC to a man who witnessed the tortuous injury and death of his
cohabitant partner. 18 In that case, an engaged, cohabitating couple was
riding together in a car when it collided with the defendant's car. 119
The decedent, Linda Eberling, was thrown from the car and killed.12 0
Richard Elden, Eberling's fianc6, sued defendant Robert Sheldon for
NIED and LC due to Eberling's death. 12 1
The court gave three reasons for its refusal to allow Elden to
recover damages based on NIED and LC claims: the state's interest in
promoting marriage, the administrative burden that allowing such
actions would impose on the courts, and the need to limit the
consequences for negligent acts.122 First, it explained the state's
interest in marriage by emphasizing the importance of the formal
marriage requirement, which is consistent with the state's abolition of
common law marriage and is "rooted in the necessity of providing an
institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and
responsibilities of persons in organized society." 123
115. Porter,986 F.2d at 1019.
116. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988); Mega Life and Health
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d. 399,403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
117. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988)
118. Elden, 758 P.2d at 582.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 582-83.
122. Elden, 758 P.2d at 586-88.
123. Id at 587 (quoting Laws v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983)).
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Second, the court emphasized the administrative burden that
fact-intensive inquiries would place on courts.1 24 Allowing such claims
"would require a court to inquire into the relationship of the partners"
to determine whether the relationship was sufficiently equivalent to a
marriage or other familial relationship capable of recovery.125 The
necessary investigation would include components such as sexual
fidelity, financial ties, and emotional commitment to one another.' 26 it
would also include intangible factors that would fail to provide a
"sufficiently definite and predictable test" for courts to use to ensure
consistent application from case to case.' 2 7
Finally, the court expressed concern about a "ripple effect" of
consequences for negligent defendants, absent limits on the number of
persons to whom they owe a duty of care. 128 While it acknowledged
the temptation to give legal rights to people with close emotional ties
to the victim, it opted in favor of a bright-line rule because of the
difficulty courts would face in determining which relationships were
eligible for legal rights.' 29 If the court was to extend liability to other
types of close relationships, the "problems of multiplication of actions
and damages.. .would place an intolerable burden on society."'so The
vast majority of subsequent state court decisions have relied on or used
the same analysis as Elden in denying both NIED and LC claims
brought by cohabitants.1 3 1
A few recent cases, however, have distinguished Elden and
allowed unmarried partners to obtain "spousal" benefits against third
parties. These holdings carry minimal weight, however, because the
124. Elden, 758 P.2d at 587.
125. Id. (arguing a need to determine whether there was an emotional attachment
between the parties and whether the relationship was stable and significant (internal citations
omitted)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 577-78.
129. Id. at 588.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Milberger v. KBHL, Inc., 486 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1163, 1167 (D.Haw. 2007)
(holding that victim's fianc6 lacked standing to bring NIED and LC claims because fianc6
was not "closely related" enough to the victim); Grotts v. Zahner, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (Nev.
1999) (holding that victim's fianc6 lacked standing to bring NIED claim); Lindsey v. Vistitec,
Inc. 804 F.Supp. 1340, 1343-44 (D.Wash. 1992) (holding that victim's fianc6 was not entitled
to bring a NIED claim because she was not an immediate family member); Rodriquez v.
Kirchhoefel, 26 Cal.Rptr..3d 891,,892 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that only blood or martial
relatives can bring NIED claims); Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, OC, 3 P.3d 916,
922-23 (Alaska 2000) (holding that unmarried cohabitants cannot bring LC claims); Feliciano
v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1987) (holding that an LC claim cannot
be raised by a person who has not accepted the "correlative responsibilities of marriage").
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party seeking recovery was in an easily identifiable, status-based
relationship with the victim, either as a registered domestic partner or a
fianc6.132 One such court distinguished between domestic partners and
couples who merely cohabitate, reasoning that "domestic partners, like
'formally married couples,' have been 'granted significant rights and
bear important responsibilities toward one another which are not
shared' by couples who cohabit or who have not registered as
domestic partners. 133 Furthermore, the "practical considerations"
favoring marriage are also served by domestic partnerships because a
registered domestic partnership "provides a readily verifiable method
of proof for determining eligibility for services and benefits." 34
Some courts have allowed recovery for the parallel tort of
NIED to individuals with a close relationship to the victim.13 5 As in
Elden, these two tort claims are often brought together.136 They are
different, however, in that recovery for NIED provides compensation
"for the emotional shock caused when a person actually witnesses the
injury of a loved one, not for the later harm to the relationship" that
characterizes an LC claim. 137 A few courts have allowed people other
than spouses with close family relationships to the victim to bring
NIED claims.138 Parents, siblings, and grandparents have been entitled
to legal recourse, but first cousins and best friends who alleged a
relationship "akin to" a sibling have been denied recovery.139
Most of the cases that have rejected Elden and granted
recovery for NIED to a cohabitant partner have done so only when the
partner was engaged to the victim. In the 1993 case of Dunphy v.
Gregor, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a landmark decision
granting recovery for NIED to a woman bystander who witnessed the
132. See, e.g., Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d 1212, 1223-24 (Cal.
2005) (lesbian registered domestic partners entitled to club benefits previously reserved for
married couples); In re Rabin, 359 B.R. 242, 248-49 (Cal. 2007) (domestic partners entitled to
joint filing of bankruptcy petition and payment of single fee).
133. Koebke, 115 P.3d, at 1223-24.
134. Id. at 845.
135. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994); Richmond v. Shatford, CA
941249, 1995 WL 1146885, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 8, 1995) (holding that a NIED plaintiff
is not required to have a legally recognized familiar relationship with the victim).
136. Alisha M. Carlile, Like Family: Rights of Nonmarried CohabitationalPartners in
Loss of ConsortiumActions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 391, 404 (2004-05).
137. Id. at 404.
138. See e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 766 (Haw. 1974).
139. See Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 197 Cal.Rptr. 411, 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (refusing
to extend NIED to friends); Kately v. Wilkinson, 195 Cal.Rptr. 902, 906-07 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983) (refusing to extend NEID to first cousins); Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d
561, 563 (Iowa 1982) (extending NED to siblings); Genzer v. City of Mission, 666 S.W.2d
16, 122 (Tex.App. 1983) (extending NIED to grandparents).
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death of her fianc6, with whom she cohabitated.14 0 The court
emphasized the importance of a marital or intimate familial
relationship between the plaintiff and the injured person for a
bystander-claimant to recover for NIED.141 The court noted that the
relationship between the victim and the bystander must be deep and
intimate to justify compensation to the bystander.142 Specifically, "the
genuine suffering which flows from such harm" must be significantly
greater to the bystander than "the setbacks and sorrows of everyday
life, or even to the apprehension of harm to another, less intimate
person." 43
In contrast to Elden, the Dunphy court rejected the bright-line
rule limiting recovery to bystanders who are spouses or blood relatives
of the victim. 144 Instead, it held that tort law principles require an
analysis of the duty of care owed by the defendant based on the facts,
and that such a duty rests on fairness, not on the legal status of the
relationship. 145 It held that "one can reasonably foresee that people
who enjoy an intimate familial relationship with one another will be
especially vulnerable to emotional injury resulting from a tragedy
befalling one of them." 4 6 The standard for foreseeability, therefore,
supports the conclusion that "persons engaged to be married and living
together may foreseeably fall into that category of relationship" that is
"deep, lasting and genuinely intimate," which makes the bystander
partner capable of suffering "indelibly stunning emotional injuries." 4 7
The Dunphy court agreed with the dissent in Elden, holding
that "a standard based on the significance and stability of the
plaintiffs relationship is workable and fair," and maintained that the
courts are "capable of dealing with realities, not simply the legalities
of relationships" to determine whether a cohabitating partner's
emotional injury is "genuine and deserving of compensation, and the
task of the inquiry into the relationship 'poses no special obstacles' in

140. 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994). Eileen Dunphy and her fianc6 Michael Burwell
were changing a tire on the side of the road when a car negligently driven by defendant Gregor
hit Burwell and dragged him hundreds of feet. Id. at 373. Burwell died a short time later, and
Dunphy filed a claim for NIED for having witnessed the accident that caused his death. Id.
141. Id. at 380.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 374 (quoting Partee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 98-99 (1980)).
144. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 374.
145. Id. at 377 (citing Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 57 (1993)).
146. Id. at 377.
147. Id. (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994)).
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a bystander liability case."1 48 It criticized the Elden court for choosing
administrative simplicity over fair results, noting that "to foreclose
such a plaintiff from making a claim based upon emotional harm
because her relationship with the injured person does not carry a
particular label is to work a potential injustice, not only in this case but
also in too many others."l 49
The Dunphy opinion identifies factors that a jury should
consider in order to determine the intimacy and familial nature of a
cohabitation relationship.15 0 These factors include the duration of the
relationship, degree of mutual dependence, extent of common
contributions to a life together, extent and quality of shared
experience, cohabitation living arrangements, emotional dependence
on each other, particulars of their day-to-day relationship, and the
manner in which they related to each other in attending to life's
mundane requirements.15 ' The court found that Dunphy indeed shared
an intimate, familial-type relationship with Burwell that entitled to her
to recovery for NIED even though she was not legally related to
him.152 A small number of courts have followed Dunphy and allowed a
fianc6 to make a claim for NIED.1 3
The outlier Dunphy case helped set the stage for the 2003
decision in Lozoya v. Sanchez, where New Mexico became the first
and only state to date to allow an unmarried cohabitant to bring a
claim for LC.154 Sarah Lozoya sought compensation for injuries
suffered in a car accident by her cohabitant partner, Ubaldo Lozoya.15 5
At the time of the accident, the couple had been together for thirty
years and had three children.156 They owned their home jointly and

148. Id. at 377-78 (quoting Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 593 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard,
J., dissenting)).
149. Id. at 378.
150. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 378.
151. Id
152. Id. at 380.
153. See, e.g., Yovino v. Big Bubba's BBQ, LLC, 896 A.2d 161, 165 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2006) ("the relationship between an engaged couple may be the basis of a claim" for bystander
NIED); Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255 (N.H. 2003) (allowing fianc6 of motorcyclist
killed in accident to bring a NIED claim). But see Richmond v. Shatford, No. CA941249,
1995 WL 1146885, at *3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 8, 1995) (acknowledging that a woman who
lived with but was neither engaged to, nor a registered domestic partner of the victim could
not recover on a claim for NIED).
154. 66 P.3d 948, 954 (N.M. 2003); Alisha M. Carlile, Like Family: Rights of
Nonmarried CohabitationalPartnersin Loss of ConsortiumActions, 46 B.C. L. REV. 391, 409
(2004-2005).
155. Lozoya, 66 P.3d at 951-52.
156. Id. at 952.
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filed joint tax returns.157 Both Sarah and Ubaldo testified about how
their physical and emotional relationship worsened dramatically after
the accident. 5 8
The Lozoya court held that legal status should not be the
dividing line for LC claims.' 59 Accordingly, Sarah Lozoya's
relationship with Ubaldo entitled her to bring an action for
compensation.160 The court considered cases from other states that
held that an unmarried partner could not sue for LC, but ultimately
decided that "[e]ase of administration. . .does not necessarily further
the interests of justice" and the court must "consider the purpose"
behind the claim.'61 Moreover, the person bringing the cause of action
seeks recovery for injury to a "relational interest, not a legal
interest."' 62 Dependence on a strict legal standard excludes from
recovery many people who have suffered a loss to their relationship
interest equally devastating as a loss suffered by a legal spouse.
The Lozoya opinion agreed with Dunphy in rejecting a brightline rule in favor of a factual investigation determining whether a
claimant is owed a duty of care. 163 If the claimant proves she is in an
"intimate familial relationship" with the victim, then it is foreseeable
that the defendant would owe her a duty of care.' 64 The court found
that Ubaldo and Sarah's relationship was "very similar, if not identical,
to that of the typical married couple."' 65 The court also mentioned that
while New Mexico does not recognize common law marriage, the
couple would have easily met the test for it, which strengthened
Sarah's position for an LC claim.166
The Supreme Court of New Mexico, however, recently limited
the application of Lozoya. It declined to follow Lozoya in holding that
domestic partners are not included in the definition of "family
members" for automobile insurance contracts;' 6 7 New Mexico does
not have a registration system for domestic partners. It reasoned that
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id at 954-55 (agreeing with the court in Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376, 378
(N.J. 1994), that it should not be guided by a 'bright-line' rule when deciding loss of
consortium claims).
160. Id. at 961.
161. Id at 954-55.
162. Id. at 955.
163. Id. (citing Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 376, 378 (N.J. 1994)).
164. Id at 958.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 957-58.
167. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Cline, 139 P.3d 176, 178 (N.M. 2006).
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even though its holding in Lozoya "recognizes an important relational
interest," that decision "was not intended to confer general contractual
rights to domestic partners similar to those contractual rights enjoyed
by married couples."' 6 8
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The differences between the MCP and the ATP have led this
author to make different recommendations for the two privileges. The
following section concludes that the MCP should be extended to
unmarried cohabitants, and the ATP should not be extended to
unmarried cohabitants unless they are registered partners.
A. The Marital CommunicationsPrivilegeShould be Extended to
UnmarriedCohabitants.
The MCP should be extended to unmarried cohabitants. Doing
so is consistent with the purpose behind the privilege, the tendency
among states to extend rights and obligations between cohabitating
couples, and does not create a significant administrative burden on
courts.
1. Public Policy Rationale Supports Extending the MCP to
UnmarriedCohabitants.
The policy arguments that support an MCP for married couples
apply equally to cohabitants. Both types of relationships benefit from
the purpose behind the MCP, which is to protect the harmony of a
relationship throughout its duration. States have an interest in
protecting cohabitating relationships because, as the New Jersey
legislature explained, "[t]hese familial relationships assist the State by
establishing a private support network for the financial, physical, and
emotional health of their participants." Cohabitants make "important
material and non-economic contributions.. .to each other, and to the
State."l 69
States that have an established registration system for
cohabitants are sending a strong signal that they have an interest in
protecting these relationships. 170 The Washington domestic partnership
statute, for example, states that "the rights granted to state registered
168. Id. at 179.
169. Domestic Partnership Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §26:8A-1 (West 2007) (effective July
10, 2004).
170. See supra note 102 (listing states with registration systems).
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domestic partners. . .will further Washington's interest in promotin
family members[.]"'
family relationships and protecting
statutes do not specify a
of
state
the
majority
the
fact
that
Furthermore,
sexual orientation requirement for cohabitants suggests that these
states view cohabitation as an option that is as equally desirable as
marriage, not as a subpar alternative for those who cannot marry.
The MCP allows couples to communicate freely and intimately
with one another without fear of future backlash. It is more conducive
to change with respect to its scope than the ATP because the purpose
of the MCP is rooted in maintaining meaningful relationships. By
contrast, the purpose behind the ATP is wholly status-based, a
characteristic that makes changing the scope of the ATP more
difficult.
Additionally, invocation of the MCP does not have as farreaching implications as the ATP. A witness who holds this privilege
may still be required to take the stand; however, he or she may not
disclose confidential communications.1 72 The defendant cannot stop
the witness from testifying about matters other than the privileged
statements. The MCP does not infringe on the search for truth the way
the ATP does as a total bar to testimony.
Extending the MCP to cohabitants is consistent with the public
policy supporting communication-based privileges. Courts have
expressed a willingness to expand communication-based privileges
that serve public goals and will not hamper the truth-finding process in
an unacceptable way.' 73 Just as the Jaffee Court reasoned that
counseling services provided by psychotherapists and social workers
"serve the same public goals" and distinguishing between them
"serves no discernible public purpose," extending the MCP to
unmarried cohabitants is a logical next step.174 Similarly,
distinguishing between married and unmarried individuals "who share
an important, personal, emotional, and committed relationship with
another adult" 1 likewise serves no discernible public purpose. 176In
sum, extending the MCP to unmarried cohabitants is consistent with
the purpose of the MCP to preserve relationships, and the policy

171. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.60.2010 (West 2007).
172. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTs & JUD. PROC. § 9-105 (West 2002).

173. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1996); see supra Part II.
174. Id. at 16.
175. Domestic Partnership Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §26:8A-1 (West (2007) (effective July

10, 2004).
176. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 16.
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where other

2. Extension of the MCP is Consistent with the Trend Among
States to Extend Rights Between UnmarriedCouples.
Extension of the MCP privilege also aligns with the trend
among states to grant rights and obligations to cohabitants. Stategranted rights and obligations imply a sense of mutual support
between a couple where, like spouses, partners can make important
decisions for one another.' 7 7 The MCP furthers this notion, as it fosters
mutual support between parties in a relationship by allowing them to
openly exchange information throughout the relationship.
3. Extension of the MCP Would Place a Minimal
Administrative Burden on Courts.
The absence of a substantial administrative burden that would
result from factual inquiries tips the scales in favor of extending the
MCP to cohabitants. Certain areas of criminal law, family law, and tort
law demonstrate that courts can, and do, inquire into the nature of the
relationship in order to determine the appropriate outcome of an
action.
Criminal courts already conduct factual investigations with
respect to the MCP. They must conduct a factual inquiry to determine
whether a marital communication was "communicative" in nature and
whether it was "confidential" in order to apply the MCP.1 78 In
addition, they must examine the individual facts of a relationship to
determine application of the MCP in situations where the
reconcilability of the marriage is questionable.1 79 The factors a judge
uses to determine irreconcilability, including duration of the
relationship and stability at the time of the communication, could also
be used to determine an unmarried couple's eligibility for the
privilege. 80 The Elden dissent emphasized this point in rejecting a
bright-line rule for third party tort injuries.' 8 It argued that courts and
juries regularly make sensitive factual determinations, and they are
177. See supra Part Ill.B.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 n. 22 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(explaining that in "particular contexts," Id. at I 150, acts can be communicative, and that to
resolve the issue of whether the communication was confidential, "a preliminary examination
of the spouse-witness . .. is wholly in order." Id. at 1151 n. 22 (quoting Sacks v. Sacks, 124
F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1941))).
179. See supra Part LB.
180. See supra note 33.
181. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 592-93 (Cal. 1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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perfectly capable of doing so in other situations, such as in LC
Even for a married couple, the judge and jury must consider
cases.
evidence "concerning the quality and nature of the plaintiffs
relationship with his or her partner before and after the injury."1 83
Therefore, the same inquiry is necessary whether or not the couple
possesses the legal status of marriage.' 84
Granted, courts only conduct these inquiries when there is
doubt as to the validity of the marriage, and they would have to
conduct them more regularly in order to determine whether an
unmarried couple qualifies. The key fact, however, is that these judges
know how to conduct such inquiries. The number of MCP
investigations will undoubtedly increase, but it will not require a judge
to learn a new skill, as would be the case with the ATP. An elaborate
inquiry will not be necessary when a couple has registered as domestic
partners.
Areas of family law provide guidance that can help ease
administrative concerns over a MCP extension. For example, states
could require that a couple prove a "marital-type relationship" 185 to be
eligible for the privilege. In Devaney v. L'Esperance, a judge
considered numerous factors when deciding whether an unmarried
partner had a valid claim for palimony.186 Palimony would be justified
in a situation where there existed a promise to support, and a "maritaltype relationship," as opposed to "a dating relationship."l87 To
establish a "marital-type relationship," the judge considered the extent
of cohabitation, time spent together, commingled property, shared
living expenses, and whether the couple held "themselves out to the
public as husband and wife." 88 The American Law Institute ("ALI")
provides factors similar to the Devaney factors in its proposed
principles to determine rights and obligations of unmarried partners
upon dissolution of the relationship.' 89

182. Id.
183. Id. at 592.
184. Id. at 593-94.
185. Devaney v. L'Esperance, 949 A.2d 743, 744 (N.J. 2008).
186. Id. at 750-51. "Palimony" refers to a right to financial support arising from
cohabitation. See Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal
Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 315 (2008-2009).
187. Id. at 744.
188. Id. at 750.
189. Compare Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations, 2002 A.L.I. § 6.03 with Devaney v. L'Esperance, 949 A.2d 743, 750-51

(N.J. 2008).
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The factors articulated in Dunphy and Devane provide a
framework for a cohabitant's ability to invoke the MCP. Given that
the purpose behind the MCP is more relationship-focused than the
ATP, the Dunphy and Devaney factors provide applicable guidance
favoring extension of the MCP to unmarried couples.
The growing number of cohabitating couples and the
willingness of courts to accommodate their relationships in various
areas of the law suggest that they should also be recognized in the
criminal law context of the MCP. States that have registration systems
for cohabitants should use an individual's status as a registered partner
as a basis for access to the MCP. Courts in states that do not have such
a system should adopt the Dunphy, Devaney, or ALI factors to guide
their factual inquiries to determine which cohabitants may invoke the
MCP.
B. The Adverse Testimonial Privilege Should Not be Extended to
UnmarriedCohabitants.
Extending the ATP to unmarried cohabitants will not serve an
interest so important that it overrides the public interest in every man's
evidence.1 91 The stakes in criminal trials are higher than in the civil
realm due to the risk of the guilty going free, and, as public policy
compels, states must proceed with extreme caution when meddling
with the fair administration of justice.' 92 Arguments analogous to the
majority view in the third party tort cases, 193 domestic violence
concerns, and administration burdens tip the scales against extending
this privilege to unmarried couples. While compelling spousal
testimony might seem contrary to our societal values that promote
familial preservation, the Supreme Court is correct when it contends
that "it may just be the cost of doing justice."' 94

190. See Devaney, 949 A.2d at 750-51 (N.J. 2008); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372,
375-80 (N.J. 1994).
191. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(stating that the rule governing admissible evidence in federal courts is that deep need of
society to be entitled to every man's evidence).
192. See, e.g. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating it
is "our duty to proceed cautiously when erecting barriers between us and the truth").
193. See supra Part III.C.
194. Dan Markel et al., Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, 4 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1147, 1205 (2007).
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1.The Problems with Extending the ATP to UnmarriedCouples
are Analogous to Third Party Tort Cases.
The issues associated with extending the ATP parallel the
issues considered in the cases that disfavor extending rights to thirdparties. In those cases, courts were reluctant to grant rights to
cohabitants where there was significant third party interest
involvement.195 The Elden line of cases represents the vast majority
viewpoint among states, which gives Elden substantially more weight
than the few cases that have granted rights to third parties.
The reasoning in Elden applies directly to the ATP. Two of the
arguments made by the Elden court are particularly analogous to the
privilege debate: the need to limit consequences for defendants, and
the need to avoid placing additional administrative burdens on
courts. 196

Just as the Elden court refused to extend a duty of care owed to
someone not foreseeable to the driver, a witness should not be entitled
to invoke the ATP where such invocation is not foreseeable by the
public. Cohabitation itself is a relatively new cultural trend and its
numbers are small in comparison to the married population.1 97 With
cohabitation still in its infancy, an unmarried cohabitant's claim of
access to the ATP is neither widely understood in society nor intuitive
to the public. Prosecutors and law enforcements officers are unlikely
to anticipate use of the privilege by an unmarried witness when
preparing cases and should not be blindsided by a court extending a
right to an unforeseen third party.
Most of the cases that purport to distinguish Elden by holding
that a fianc6 or a registered domestic partner satisfies the foreseeability
standard nevertheless maintained a status-based standard.198 These
cases suggest that the engagement or registered partnership was a key
component in the decision to grant rights to the bystander fianc6, and
that the holding would have been different if the couple had not been
engaged at the time of the accident.' 99 The Dunphy court explained
that "[p]ersons engaged to be married and living together may
foreseeably fall into that category of relationship" that is "deep,
lasting, and genuinely intimate," and thus eligible for third party
195. See supra PartIII.C.
196. See infra Part IV.A.3 for discussion on administrative burdens.
197. See supra Part III.A.
198. See Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 375-80 (N.J. 1994). See Koebke v. Bernardo
Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d 1212, 1223 (Cal. 2005); In re Rabin, 359 B.R. 242, 247
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); Yovino v. Big Bubba's BBQ, LLC, 896 A.2d 161, 164-67
(Conn.Super.Ct. 2006).
199. See Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 377
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rights. 200 The high break-up rate and short duration of cohabitating
relationships indicate that non-engaged cohabitants are unlikely to be
considered as having such a relationship. 20 1
A Connecticut court provided an explanation similar to
Dunphy, but added that giving a fianc6 standing to make an emotional
distress claim "does not open up the floodgate for litigants."20 2 Rather,
"the 'closely related' condition remains an exacting requirement that
still bars" other strangers, friends and relatives.2 03 Similarly, a
California court granted third party rights to unmarried partners in a
discrimination suit, but emphasized that the couple's registration as
domestic partners was an important factor in its analysis.204 Such
decisions that distinguish Elden are narrow in scope and ultimately
rely on a couple's status as engaged or registered. They minimize
Dunphy 's weight and limit its application to Lozoya. 205
The decisions of the courts that have granted third party rights
to unmarried partners in tort cases are distinguishable from the
criminal cases in which the ATP applies. In the tort cases, the judge
can make the factual determination about the relationship at the same
time he or she considers the factual issues related to liability.20 6
Extending an evidentiary privilege, on the other hand, requires a
separate fact-intensive determination that delays a trial.207 Thus, the
impact of extending the ATP is likely greater than the impact of
extending third party rights to unmarried partners in tort cases.
2. Prevalence of Domestic Violence in Unmarried
Relationships Cuts Against Extension.
One of the areas where the ATP has the most dramatic effect is
in domestic violence cases. 20 8 Victims of domestic abuse often drop
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 87-92 (providing statistics on the length of cohabitating versus
marital relationships).
202. Yovino v. Big Bubba's BBQ, LLC, 896 A.2d 161, 166 (Conn.Super. Ct. 2006).
203. Id. at 166-67.
204. Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club, 115 P.3d 1212, 1216, 1225-27 (Cal.
2005).
205. Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 955 (N.M. 2003). An unreported Massachusetts
case also follows Dunphy. See Richmond v. Shatford, No. CA941249, 1995 WL 1146885, at
*2-3 (Mass. Super. Aug. 8, 1995).
206. See supra Part .c.
207. See supra Part .b.
208. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors,Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE L.J. & FEMINISM 3, 15 (1999)
(explaining that prosecutors believed they could not convict a defendant if the victim refused
to testify and cooperate).
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charges or invoke the ATP and refuse to testify against the defendant
spouse for reasons including intimidation, fear of retaliation, and fear
of loneliness. 209 In these situations, a prosecutor is likely to drop the
case entirely because he or she believes it will not result in a
conviction without the victim's cooperation. 2 10 Given that domestic
violence "is rarely a one-time event" and often "increases in frequency
and severity over time," a victim's use of the ATP and the prosecutor
potentially dropping the case encourages the already-likely recurrence
of domestic violence. 2 1 1
High domestic violence rates among unmarried couples cut
strongly against the argument to extend the privilege to such
couples. 2 12 Rights and obligations for unmarried cohabitants are more
easily justified in a civil context, where the consequences of such
rights have a minimal impact on society. In the criminal venue,
however, society pays a higher price if a victim's invocation of the
privilege enables a guilty defendant to go free and commit a
subsequent act of violence.
Studies have shown that incidents of domestic violence are
significantly higher among unmarried cohabitants than among
spouses.213 A survey conducted by the National Crime Victimization
Survey reported that two-thirds of "acts of intimate violence against
women" were committed by boyfriends rather than husbands. 2 14
Boyfriends, ex-boyfriends, or ex-spouses committed twenty-one
percent of all rapes against women in 1992-93, while husbands
committed five percent.2 1 In 2008, thirty-one percent of domestic
violence victims in Maryland were married (primarily wives), while
216
forty-three percent were females assaulted by male cohabitants.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 7.
212. See infra notes 218-223 and accompanying text.
213. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 93, at 155 (citing 1987-88 National Survey of
Families and Households; emphasizing that this fact is consistent throughout various types of
research "regardless of methodology").
214. Id. at 155. The National Crime Victimization Survey's definition of "intimate
violence" excludes "violence committed by those casual dating partners a woman considers
'friends' or 'acquaintances,' rather than boyfriends." Id. While this study is somewhat
outdated (conducted in 1992-1993), it is cited because it is the only legitimate study this
author could find that differentiates between married and unmarried victims of domestic
violence. Current studies almost exclusively cite rates of "intimate partner violence," a term
that includes both married and unmarried individuals.
215. Id.
216. Domestic Violence, CRIME IN MARYLAND: 2008 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT 53, 57
(2009), available at http://www.mdsp.org/downloads/2008_CrimeIn-Maryland.pdf (last
visited Oct. 29, 2010). In 2008, 18,926 domestic violence crimes were reported, but these
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Approximately three percent of the cohabitant victims were involved
217
Another study concluded that "married
in same-sex relationships.
people are much less likely than cohabitating couples to say that
arguments between them and their partners had become physical in the
past year." 218
There are various explanations as to why domestic violence is
more prevalent in cohabitating relationships. One theo 7 holds that a
cohabitant's place in society fuels physical aggression. 19 Researcher
Jen Stets argues that cohabitants feel a sense of social isolation where
they are "less integrated into networks of kin and community."220
Under these circumstances, the roles and expectations of cohabitants
"are particularly ill-defined[,] as are social expectations about the
nature and purpose of their relationship. "221 A partner's ambivalence
about the societal expectations he is expected to meet could provide
him with an excuse to be less committed, or more violent, than if he
222
were a spouse.
Another theory contends that a boyfriend or girlfriend might be
more violent than a spouse because he or she has less to lose. 2 The
knowledge that a cohabitating relationship is not considered by society
to be as serious and committed as a marriage suggests that aggression
is not as costly for cohabitants as it is for spouses.224 If the aggression
causes the relationship to terminate, "they will not suffer as much as
married people, who have a greater long-term interest and may lose
numbers could be much higher in reality because only an estimated twenty-five percent of
domestic violence incidents are reported to the police. Domestic Violence in Maryland,
MARYLAND

NETWORK

AGAINST

DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE,

available

at

http://www.mnadv.org/DVStats/ucrstats.html (last visited on Oct. 29, 2010). See also MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW

§ 4-501

(West 2006) for the definition of abuse.

217. Domestic Violence, supra note 217, at 57. But see Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex
Domestic Violence: Claiming a Domestic Share While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 325, 330 & n.23 (1999) (asserting that while there is limited
empirical work on the issue, domestic violence rates among same-sex couples are similar to
the rates for heterosexual couples: an estimated twenty-five percent to thirty-three percent of
"same-sex relationships involve physical or psychological abuse"). Knauer notes that these
numbers indicate "that an individual in a same-sex relationship is more likely to be abused by
his or her partner than beaten in an act of anti-gay violence." Id.
218. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 93, at 155 (citing 1987-88 National Survey of
Families and Households).
219. Id at 156.
220. Id. at 156-57.
221. Id. at 157.
222. Id.
223. See Jan E. Stets, Cohabiting and Marital Aggression: the Role of Social Isolation,
53 JOURNAL OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY, 669, 677 (1991).
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more materially, socially, and psychologically if the relationship

ends." 225
A third theory holds that lack of a firm commitment to the
relationship may increase domestic violence as a result of sexual
jealousy. Women in a cohabitating relationship are eight times more
likely to be unfaithful than married women, and cohabitating men are
four times more likely to cheat on a partner than a spouse. 227 An
unwed woman's infidelity often triggers domestic violence, as doubts
about paternity cause boyfriends to become violent towards their
pregnant girlfriends.2 2 8 This cycle helps to explain "the enormously
high levels of violence directed at unwed pregnant women by their

boyfriends." 22 9
Regardless of why domestic violence is more prevalent in
cohabitating relationships than in marriages, the statistics reflect the
potential cost of extending marital privileges to unmarried cohabitants.
Allowing unmarried couples in abusive relationships to assert a marital
privilege means that prosecutions will be more difficult and, arguably,
significantly more abusers will go free. Furthermore, an abuser's
knowledge that he is unlikely to be convicted because he can convince
the victim to invoke the privilege, could increase domestic violence
among unmarried cohabitants, while decreasing
incidents
convictions.2 30
Some states have amended their ATP statutes to weaken or
eliminate the ATP in domestic violence cases by including provisions
that compel a witness spouse to adversely testify if the defendant is
charged with domestic violence. 23 1 In Connecticut, a victim/witness
spouse "may. . .be compelled to testify in the same manner as any
other witness., 232 In Maryland, such a victim spouse may be
compelled to testify if: (1) the defendant was previously charged with
assault of the spouse; (2) the spouse was sworn to testify at the
previous trial; and (3) the spouse refused to testify at the previous trial
225. See id.
226.

DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN MATING 129-31

(1994).

227. Stets, supranote 224, at 679.
228. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 93, at 157.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Louise Ellison, Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim
Participation,65 MOD. L. REV. 834, 846 (2002).

231. See generally, Debra T. Landis, "Crimes against spouse with an exception
permitting testimony by one spouse against other in criminal prosecution," 74 A.L.R. 223
(1989).
232. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§

54-84a (West 2009).
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based on the ATP.2 3 3 The Maryland provisions are problematic,
however, because they require specific circumstances that likely
exclude many victims of domestic violence. Where mandated spousal
testimony is so narrow in application, it does little to combat the
problem of the ATP serving as a mechanism to keep domestic violence
victims silent.
The problem of marriedvictims refusing to testify is already so
great that prosecutors are attempting to create ways to convict an
abuser without relying on witness testimony, a daunting task
considering most episodes of domestic violence take place in the
privacy of a home without other witnesses.2 3 4 Some states have
attempted to shift their domestic violence conviction strategies in favor
of "victimless prosecutions," 235 but these strategies have remained
limited in use and marked by criticism. 236
Alaska and California have revised their rules of evidence to
admit evidence of a defendant's prior acts of domestic violence for
propensity purposes.23 7 The other 48 states, however, have adhered to
the historical ban on admitting such evidence. Therefore, this
alternative method of proof is of little use in most domestic violence
cases.
Prosecutors have also pressured state legislatures to adopt new
hearsay exceptions that make admissible prior out of court statements
of an absent complainant in a domestic violence case. Aain however,
only a small minority of states have made such a change.
Some states have adopted a no-drop policy in domestic
violence prosecutions. 239 Under this policy, prosecutors "view intimate
violence as a crime against the state and seek to vindicate the
government's interests regardless of the individual victim's wishes." 240
While the policy increases the number of annual prosecutions, critics

233. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-106 (LexisNexis 2006). There are no
comparable domestic violence provisions for the MCP in Maryland.
234. See infra, notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
235. Louise Ellison, Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim Participation, 65
MOD. L. REV. 834, 834, 840-41 (2002).

236. See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
237. Andrea M. Kovach, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic Violence for
PropensityPurposes: A Brieflook at its Past, Present, and Future,U. ILL. L. REV. 1115, 1117,
1132-32, 1140-41 (2003).
238. Ellison, supra note 236, at 846-48 (referring to California Evidence Code Section
1370 states include California and Oregon).
239. Epstein, supra note 209, at 16.
240. Id.
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worry that it makes victims more reluctant to call the police to a
domestic abuse scene out of fear that they too will be arrested.2 4 1
These new approaches prosecutors are using demonstrate the
need for alternative methods of proof because victims commonly
refuse to testify, thereby posing a challenge to securing a domestic
violence conviction. 242 From a domestic violence standpoint,
expanding the ATP to unmarried couples will escalate a problem to
which there is no effective solution. If extended, both victims and
prosecutors will experience an additional barrier to the pursuit of
justice.
3.Extension of the A TP to UnmarriedCohabitants Would Place
Significant Administrative Burdens on Courts.
Extension of the Adverse Testimonial Privilege would generate
significant administrative challenges to court systems. Unlike the
MCP, courts do not currently conduct factual inquiries of any sort to
determine whether the testimonial privilege may be invoked.2 43
Extending the ATP to unmarried cohabitants would require a detailed
factual inquiry focusing on the nature of the relationship.244 Such an
investigation to determine privilege-worthy relationships would both
delay a trial and derail it into unfamiliar territory. Criminal judges
would have to pause the prosecution of the defendant in order to probe
intimate aspects of a witness' relationship to the defendant. In
Maryland, where the court system handles over 3,000 criminal trials
per year, there are not enough resources to accommodate such
individualized, fact-based detours. 24 5 Conducting factual inquiries
could create a judicial backlog that would jeopardize a defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial.24 6 From a practical standpoint, a
bright-line rule for the testimonial privilege provides the only way to
keep busy criminal courts running efficiently.

241. Laurie Kohn, Note, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 191, 217-18 (2008).
242. See Epstein, supra note 209, at 15 (explaining the common practice among
prosecutors to drop charges "at the victim's request" because the prosecutors believed "that
convictions could not be obtained without victim cooperation and testimony").
243. See supra Part I.b-c.
244. See supra Part I.c (describing the status-based nature of the ATP).
245. 2006 - 2007 Annual Statistical Abstract, MARYLAND JUDICIARY Table CC-18
at
available
(2008),
http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreport/reports/2007/2007 annualreport.pdf
(last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
246. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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The declining number of states that recognize common law
marriage reflects the reluctance of courts to accept the burden of
determining the existence of a relationship comparable to marriage. In
the heyday of common law marriage, most states held a common law
marriage valid if the parties (1) lived together, (2) held themselves out
as married, and (3) mutually intended to be married.24 7 Today, less
than twelve states permit common law marriage. 24 8 One of the reasons
for the trend away from recognizing common law marriage is the lack
of a bright-line rule. States that abolish it indicate that they are not
willing to expend judicial resources on such case-by-case factual
investigations. 249 In 2003, a Pennsylvania court supported the abolition
of common law marriage, expressing the need "to abandon a system
that allows the determination of important rights to rest on evidence
fraught with inconsistencies, ambiguities and vagaries." 250 Allowing
unmarried cohabitants to exercise the ATP would resurrect the
problems that courts hoped to bury by eliminating common law
marriage.
A state with an ex-ante registration system for cohabitants,
however, can minimize administrative concerns. The existence of such
a system provides a stronger argument for extending the privilege to
registered couples. Where a couple has gained domestic partner status
through an ex-ante registration system, the investigatory burden no
longer falls on the courts to determine if a witness may invoke a
privilege as a threshold matter, thus maintaining consistency and
efficiency in the court system. While only a handful of jurisdictions
have expressly stated whether evidentiary privileges apply to
registered domestic partners, an ex-ante system gives a judge a basis
on which to hold that the mere existence of a registration is akin to the
existence of a marriage. Allowing registered partners to access the
privilege essentially extends the bright-line rule to include these
couples without placing an additional burden on the courts.

247. See Douglas E. Abrams et al., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 160-61 n. 3-4 (West

2006) (providing examples of elements that courts use to determine common law marriages).
248. See Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1020 n.3 (Pa. 1998) (collecting
authorities).
249. See PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 831 A.2d 1269, 1279, 128081 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
250. Id. at 1279. Pennsylvania formally abolished common law marriage in 2005. See 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN

§

1103 (West 2008).
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V. CONCLUSION

The strong public policy against testimonial privileges conflicts
with the purpose behind the marital privileges aimed at family
preservation. When weighed against each other, the disadvantages of
extending the MCP to unmarried couples are minimal. The MCP
should be extended to unmarried cohabitants because it will not place
undue administrative burdens on courts and is consistent with societal
trends. By contrast, the costs of extending the ATP to unmarried
cohabitants exceed the benefits. Administrative burdens and domestic
violence concerns tip the scales against extension. These concerns,
however, are minimized when cohabitants are registered partners
under an ex-ante state registration system, and the ATP should be
extended to these individuals.

